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Information and Communication Technology market 
experience
– 20 years as a practitioner
– 7 years as an academic
– one of only a few New Zealand academics researching and 
publishing in the peer-reviewed academic literature on the 
actual and relative performance of New Zealand 
telecommunications, Internet and broadband markets 
– the only academic publishing extensively using New Zealand 
uptake and usage data
‘STOCKTAKE’ FINDINGS
New Zealand’s low exhibited broadband uptake rate 
is the consequence of a competition ‘problem’
Lack of competition in telecommunications markets 
has resulted in less investment and lower-quality 
products and services relative to other countries, 
thereby impeding uptake
Local Loop Unbundling (LLU) will ‘solve’ the 
competition ‘problem’, leading to higher 
investment, increased product quality and 
variety, with consequent increased broadband 
uptake
Policy target is for New Zealand to be in the top 
quartile of the OECD in broadband uptake per 
capita by 2015
‘STOCKTAKE’ METHODOLOGY I
Assumes
– broadband uptake is a proxy for economic growth potential 
in a ‘knowledge economy’
– pursuing increased broadband uptake is therefore a 
legitimate policy objective 
Diagnoses competition and investment ‘problems’
– using an unscientific rank ordering process that leads to 
misleading, if not patently incorrect, conclusions about the 
reasons for New Zealand’s low broadband uptake 
– using selective data analysis that ignores key contextual and 
international comparative elements of the dynamics of 
broadband markets
– that fails to identify or account for New Zealand’s OECD 
leadership in 
• internet uptake and usage across the period 1996-2006
• broadband supply from 1999-2002   
‘STOCKTAKE’ METHODOLOGY II
Proposes ‘solutions’ without subjecting either the 
conclusions or the proposed ‘solutions’ to a 
rigorous critique
– investment factuals and counterfactuals apparently based 
principally upon participant interviews 
• Telecom
• competitors to Telecom
• officials of policymaking bodies (e.g. OECD)
– no detailed cost-benefit analysis is undertaken
– ignores the large body of academic literature (both 
theoretical and empirical) on the effects of LLU policies on 
• broadband uptake 
• the amount, nature and timing of investment in technologically 
volatile environments
‘STOCKTAKE’ METHODOLOGY III
Consequently, the ‘Stocktake’
– makes an apparently clear-cut case for regulatory 
intervention that is
• difficult to substantiate either theoretically or empirically when 
subjected to critical review
• based upon flawed analysis and incorrect assumptions
– substantially understates the extent of the risks and 
uncertainties of the proposed regulations
DRIVERS OF BROADBAND UPTAKE
National demographics
– GDP per capita
– population density
– degree of urbanisation
Competition characteristics
– absolute and relative prices of consumer access and usage
– degree of inter-platform competition
• competing infrastructures (ADSL, cable, wireless, satellite, etc.)
• competitor market shares
– degree of intra-platform competition
• including absolute and relative prices of unbundled elements
BROADBAND UPTAKE AND GDP:
a complex interrelationship
Two-way causality
– but GDP per capita is a good predictor of technology uptake
• telephones
• television
• computers
• internet
• broadband
New Zealand’s broadband uptake consistent with GDP 
per capita
OECD BROADBAND PER CAPITA AND 
GDP PER CAPITA, DECEMBER 2005 
BROADBAND UPTAKE PER CAPITA AND 
GDP PER CAPITA – LINEAR RELATIONSHIP 
BROADBAND UPTAKE AND URBANISATION
NEW ENTRANT MARKET SHARE AND 
BROADBAND UPTAKE – OECD DATA
THE EFFECT OF PLATFORM COMPETITION 
(OECD)
‘COMPELLING’ EU ‘EVIDENCE’ OF 
UNBUNDLING AND BROADBAND UPTAKE I
‘COMPELLING’ EU ‘EVIDENCE’ OF 
UNBUNDLING AND BROADBAND UPTAKE II
EU MARKET SHARE – QUADRATIC 
RELATIONSHIP
THE MULTIVARIATE ANALYSES
Geography, inter-platform competition significant
But little evidence that intra-platform competition (LLU) 
has any significant effect 
– rather, it depends on the type of unbundling
• the more arduous the obligations upon the incumbent, the less 
likely that there will be a positive effect (Wallsten, 2006)
• here may be a small, initial transitory effect, but it dissipates 
(Denni and Gruber, 2005)
• sub-loop unbundling and virtual co-location generally negatively 
correlated; co-mingling sometimes positively correlated “
– “regulations that can reduce returns to investment (more 
extensive unbundling) or increase costs to entrants (allowing 
incumbents to insist on off-site co-location) reduce 
broadband investment … market rules that keep costs low 
but allow firms to earn returns on investment are good for 
broadband growth” (Wallsten, 2006)
PRICE MATTERS
Dial-up prices affect broadband uptake (Chaudhuri and Flamm, 2005)
– the ‘Kiwi Share’ – free local calling
• very low cost dial-up access
• ratios of 3:1 across time
– universal service obligations
Data caps in the NZ case are not related to access
– Southern Cross Cable monopoly
– unbundling impotent in respect of data caps
The price of unbundled elements affects investment 
incentives 
NZ INTERNET FACTS
NZ a world leader in Internet use per capita (ITU, 2005)
– hours per month per Internet user
Top quartile OECD performer in
– secure servers
– transactions per secure servers
– routed autonomous systems
– number of routed IP addresses
(measures of the sophistication of Internet infrastructure 
and use for commercial applications)
Speed and capacity requirements limited to a small 
number of residential applications (e.g. video)
THE APPLICATION BASE MATTERS
Growth in bandwidth use projected to be video-related
BROADBAND INVESTMENT HISTORY
New Zealand has been a world leader in broadband investment 
and innovation
Early adoption (First commercial offering 1996 - CityLink)
3rd in the OECD (after US, Canada) to offer a commercial ADSL platform
Multiple competing platforms (6)
Ethernet LAN, Satellite, DSL, Cable, Wireless, Mobile
Wide geographic coverage
Satellite, mobile, DSL near nationwide;  wireless 19+ CBDs
DSL available to 95% of Telco customers
Only Belgium, Finland and Luxembourg have wider DSL availability than NZ
Note Canada 74%, US 84%; Australia 84%; Korea 90%, Iceland 92%
NZ, Belgium, Finland, Iceland, and Luxembourg were the first countries to have fully 
digital networks  (1995) – NZ’s DSL development very similar to these comparators
All five countries exhibit similar investment patterns to NZ for all years post 1995 per 
capita, per line and per dollar of revenue (at least halving investment once 
digitalisation complete)  – in fact, NZ investment post 2000 in all 3 criteria exceeds 
that of all early digitisers except Iceland
WHICH METRIC?
Investment per capita
– bias against lower connection numbers in NZ as a 
consequence of high fixed cost/zero usage cost residential 
tariffs
Investment per access channel better
Was NZ out of line 1997-2002
– or did the rest of the OECD ‘overinvest’ during the ‘dot.com’
boom?
NZ NOT VERY DIFFERENT TO OTHER 
EARLY DIGITISERS
Investment per access channel
DESPITE VERY HIGH DIAL-UP USAGE
‘KIWI SHARE’ PROVIDED STRONG ADSL 
INVESTMENT, PRICING INCENTIVES TO 
TELECOM
A plausible explanation for
– early ADSL rollout
– high quality service offerings
– low access prices
• with data usage determined by Southern Cross charges 
No compelling evidence of an investment ‘problem’ pre 
2002
– OECD-leading supply-side profile achieved using light-
handed regulation
– subsequent investment activity might be plausibly explained 
by changes in regulatory environment
• increased regulatory uncertainty for both incumbents and 
entrants
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
EVIDENCE
Unbundling at prices below cost chills investment (US –
Hazlett, 2005)
Free real options for new entrants (Crandall, Ingraham and 
Singer, 2003)
Incentives for incumbents to delay investment if options 
relating to uncertain new technologies not fairly 
priced (Crandall and Hausmann, 2003)
EU data
– ERG claims investment increasing
– but empirical data do not support this contention
• Renda, 2006 – real investment in EU substantially less than in 
Asia and Americas
– investment occurring in telcos at expense of inter-platform 
investment (the ‘counterfactual’ investment occurring in Asia 
and Americas)
INVESTMENT INCENTIVES MATTER
Different effects of LLU on investment relating to 
cost-cutting and quality-enhancing investments
(Vareda, 2005)
– no effect on cost-reducing investments
– but lowers incentives for quality-enhancing investments
Consistent with reduced investment incentives w.r.t. 
ADSL and NGN infrastructures
CONCLUSION
Many facts, risks not addressed in the ‘Stocktake’
These factors were influential in the 
Telecommunications Commissioner’s 
recommendations in 2003
Theoretical and empirical evidence in the 
intervening time further confirm the risks 
associated with unbundling on new technology 
platforms
– there is no consensus in the academic/regulatory arena 
about the efficacy of LLU on emerging technologies
– a preference in the EU, USA  to move away from ex ante 
regulation towards ex post competition law in governing 
these emerging markets
Inter-platform competition is the desired outcome
HOW DO THE NZ PROPOSALS FIT 
WITH THIS INTERNATIONAL TREND?
